I KNOW IT LOOKS LIKE A LOT BUT THIS PURE CONCENTRATE: FORGET 'DA BOOKS....
IT MIGHT BE A GOOD TIME TO USE THAT SUMMARIZER SOFTWARE I USE.
Key Words:
"action science" effectiveness practices learning design gaps reasoning
intentions defensiveness
Chris Argyris has
made a significant contribution to the development of our appreciation of
organizational learning, and, almost in passing, deepened our understanding of experiential
learning. On this page we examine the significance of the models he developed with Donald
Schön of single-loop and double-loop learning, and how these translate into contrasting models
of organizational learning systems.
Life
Chris Argyris was
born in Newark, New Jersey on July 16, 1923 and grew up in Irvington,
New Jersey. During the Second World War he joined the Signal Corps in the U.S. Army
eventually becoming a Second Lieutenant (Elkjaer 2000). He went to university at Clark,
where he came into contact with Kurt Lewin
(Lewin had begun the Research Center for
Group Dynamics at M.I.T.). He graduated with a degree in Psychology (1947). He went on to
gain an MA in Psychology and Economics from Kansas University (1949), and a Ph.D. in
Organizational Behavior from Cornell University (he was supervised by William F. Whyte) in
1951. In a distinguished career Chris Argyris has been a faculty member at Yale University
(1951-1971) where he served as the Beach Professor of Administrative Science and Chairperson
of the department; and the James Bryant Conant Professor of Education and Organizational
Behavior at Harvard University (1971- ). Argyris is currently a director of the Monitor Company
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chris Argyris’
early research explored the impact of formal organizational structures, control
systems, and management on individuals (and how they responded and adapted to them). This
research resulted in the books Personality and Organization (1957) and Integrating the
Individual and the Organization (1964). He then shifted his focus to organizational change, in
particular exploring the behaviour of senior executives in organizations (Interpersonal
Competence and Organizational Effectiveness, 1962; Organization and Innovation,
1965). From there he moved onto a particularly fruitful inquiry into the role of the social
scientist as both researcher and actor (Intervention Theory and Method, 1970; Inner
Contradictions of Rigorous Research, 1980 and Action Science, 1985 - with Robert
Putnam and Diana McLain Smith). Much of the focus on this page lies with his fourth major
area of research and theorizing – in significant part undertaken with Donald Schön –
around
individual and organizational learning. Here the interest lies in the extent to which human
reasoning, not just behaviour, can become the basis for diagnosis and action (Theory in
Practice, 1974 ; Organizational Learning, 1978; Organizational Learning II, 1996 –
all
with Donald
Schön
). He has also developed this thinking in Overcoming Organizational
Defenses (1990), Knowledge for Action (1993).
As well as writing
and researching, Chris Argyris has been an influential teacher. This is how
Peter
Senge
(1990: 182-3) talks about his own experience of Argyris as a teacher.
Despite having read much
of his writing, I was unprepared for what I learned when I first saw
Chris Argyris practice his approach in an informal workshop… Ostensibly an academic
presentation of Argyris’s methods, it quickly evolved into a powerful demonstration of what
action science practitioners call ‘reflection in action’…. Within a matter of minutes,
I watched
the level of alertness and ‘presentness’ of the entire group rise ten notches – thanks
not so
much to Argyris’s personal charisma, but to his skilful practice of drawing out…
generalizations. As the afternoon moved on, all of us were led to see (sometimes for he first
time in our lives) subtle patterns of reasoning which underlay our behaviour; and how those
patterns continually got us into trouble. I had never had such a dramatic demonstration of own
mental models in action… But even more interesting, it became clear that, with proper training,
I could become much more aware of my mental models and how they operated. This was
exciting.
The ability, demonstrated
here, to engage with others, to make links with the general and the
particular, and to explore basic orientations and values is just what Argyris talks about when
exploring the sorts of behaviours and beliefs that are necessary if organizations are to learn and
develop.
Theories of action: theory in use and espoused theory
Our starting point
is Argyris and Schön’s (1974) argument that people have mental maps with
regard to how to act in situations. This involves the way they plan, implement and review their
actions. Furthermore, they assert that it is these maps that guide people’s actions rather than
the
theories they explicitly espouse. What is more, fewer people are aware of the maps or theories
they do use (Argyris, 1980). One way of making sense of this is to say that there is split
between theory and action. However, Argyris and Schön suggest that two theories of action
are involved.
The notion of a
theory of action can be seen as growing out of earlier research by Chris Argyris
into the relationships between individuals and organizations (Argyris 1957, 1962, 1964). A
theory of action is first a theory: ‘its most general properties are properties that all theories
share, and the most general criteria that apply to it – such as generality, centrality and simplicity
- are criteria applied to all theories’ (Argyris and Schön 1974: 4). The distinction made
between the two contrasting theories of action is between those theories that are implicit in
what we do as practitioners and managers, and those on which we call to speak of our actions
to others. The former can be described as theories-in-use. They govern actual behaviour and
tend to be tacit structures. Their relation to action 'is like the relation of grammar-in-use to
speech; they contain assumptions about self, others and environment - these assumptions
constitute a microcosm of science in everyday life' (Argyris & Schön 1974: 30). The words we
use to convey what we, do or what we would like others to think we do, can then be called
espoused theory.
When someone is asked how
he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he
usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to
which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, the
theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use. (Argyris and Schön 1974: 6-7)
Making this distinction
allows us to ask questions about the extent to which behaviour fits
espoused theory; and whether inner feelings become expressed in actions. In other words, is
there congruence between the two? Argyris (1980) makes the case that effectiveness results
from developing congruence between theory-in-use and espoused theory. For example, in
explaining our actions to a colleague we may call upon some convenient piece of theory. We
might explain our sudden rush out of the office to others, or even to ourselves at some level, by
saying that a 'crisis' had arisen with one of 'our' clients. The theory-in-use might be quite
different. We may have become bored and tired by the paper work or meeting and felt that a
quick trip out to an apparently difficult situation would bring welcome relief. A key role of
reflection
, we could argue, is to reveal the theory-in- use and to explore the nature of the 'fit'.
Much of the business of supervision, where it is focused on the practitioner’s thoughts, feelings
and actions, is concerned with the gulf between espoused theory and theory-in-use or in bringing
the later to the surface. This gulf is no bad thing. If it gets too wide then there is clearly a
difficulty. But provided the two remain connected then the gap creates a dynamic for reflection
and for dialogue.
To fully appreciate
theory-in-use we require a model of the processes involved. To this end
Argyris and Schön (1974) initially looked to three elements:
Governing variables: those
dimensions that people are trying to keep within acceptable limits.
Any action is likely to impact upon a number of such variables – thus any situation can trigger
a trade-off among governing variables.
Action strategies: the
moves and plans used by people to keep their governing values within
the acceptable range.
Consequences: what happens
as a result of an action. These can be both intended - those
actor believe will result - and unintended. In addition those consequences can be for the self,
and/or for others. (Anderson 1997)
Where the consequences
of the strategy used are what the person wanted, then the theory-in-
use is confirmed. This is because there is a match between intention and outcome. There may
be a mismatch between intention and outcome. In other words, the consequences may be
unintended. They may also not match, or work against, the person’s governing values. Argyris
and Schön suggest two responses to this mismatch, and these are can be seen in the notion of
single and double-loop learning.
Single-loop and double-loop learning
For Argyris and Schön
(1978: 2) learning involves the detection and correction of error. Where
something goes wrong, it is suggested, an initial port of call for many people is to look for another
strategy that will address and work within the governing variables. In other words, given or
chosen goals, values, plans and rules are operationalized rather than questioned. According to
Argyris and Schön (1974), this is single-loop learning. An alternative response is to question
to
governing variables themselves, to subject them to critical scrutiny. This they describe as double-
loop learning. Such learning may then lead to an alteration in the governing variables and, thus,
a
shift in the way in which strategies and consequences are framed. Thus, when they came to
explore the nature of organizational learning. This is how Argyris and Schön (1978: 2-3) described
the process in the context of organizational learning:
When the error detected
and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies
or achieve its presents objectives, then that error-and-correction process is single-loop learning.
Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the
heat on or off. The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the
temperature of the room) and take corrective action. Double-loop learning occurs when error is
detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying
norms, policies and objectives.
This process can
be represented quite easily by a simple amendment of our initial
representation of theory-in-use.
Single-loop learning
seems to be present when goals, values, frameworks and, to a significant
extent, strategies are taken for granted. The emphasis is on ‘techniques and making techniques
more efficient’ (Usher and Bryant: 1989: 87) Any reflection is directed toward making the
strategy more effective. Double-loop learning, in contrast, ‘involves questioning the role of
the
framing and learning systems which underlie actual goals and strategies’ (op. cit.). In
many
respects the distinction at work here is the one used by Aristotle
, when exploring
technical
and
practical
thought. The former involves following routines and some sort of preset plan –
and is both less risky for the individual and the organization, and affords greater control. The latter
is more creative and reflexive, and involves consideration notions of the good. Reflection here is
more fundamental: the basic assumptions behind ideas or policies are confronted… hypotheses
are publicly tested… processes are disconfirmable not self-seeking (Argyris 1982: 103-4).
The focus of much
of Chris Argyris’ intervention research has been to explore how
organizations may increase their capacity for double-loop learning. He argues that double-loop
learning is necessary if practitioners and organizations are to make informed decisions in rapidly
changing and often uncertain contexts (Argyris 1974; 1982; 1990). As Edmondson and
Moingeon (1999:160) put it:
The underlying theory,
supported by years of empirical research, is that the reasoning
processes employed by individuals in organizations inhibit the exchange of relevant information
in ways that make double-loop learning difficult – and all but impossible in situations in which
much is at stake. This creates a dilemma as these are the very organizational situations in
which double- loop learning is most needed.
The next step that
Argyris and Schön take is to set up two models that describe features of
theories-in-use that either inhibit or enhance double-loop learning. The belief is that all people
utilize a common theory-in-use in problematic situations. This they describe as Model I – and
it
can be said to inhibit double-loop learning. Model II is where the governing values associated
with theories-in-use enhance double-loop learning.
Model I and Model II
Argyris has claimed
that just about all the participants in his studies operated from theories-in-
use or values consistent with Model I (Argyris et al. 1985: 89). It involves ‘making inferences
about another person’s behaviour without checking whether they are valid and advocating
one’s own views abstractly without explaining or illustrating one’s reasoning’ (Edmondson
and
Moingeon 1999:161). The theories-in-use are shaped by an implicit disposition to winning (and
to avoid embarrassment). The primary action strategy looks to the unilateral control of the
environment and task plus the unilateral protection of self and others. As such Model I leads to
often deeply entrenched defensive routines (Argyris 1990; 1993) – and these can operate at
individual, group and organizational levels. Exposing actions, thoughts and feelings can make
people vulnerable to the reaction of others. However, the assertion that Model I is
predominantly defensive has a further consequence:
Acting defensively can
be viewed as moving away from something, usually some truth about
ourselves. If our actions are driven by moving away from something then our actions are
controlled and defined by whatever it is we are moving away from, not by us and what we would
like to be moving towards. Therefore our potential for growth and learning is seriously impaired.
If my behaviour is driven by my not wanting to be seen as incompetent, this may lead me to
hide things from myself and others, in order to avoid feelings of incompetence. For example, if
my behaviour is driven by wanting to be competent, honest evaluation of my behaviour by
myself and others would be welcome and useful. (Anderson 1997)
It is only by interrogating
and changing the governing values, the argument goes, is it possible to
produce new action strategies that can address changing circumstances.
Model I theory-in-use characteristics
The governing Values
of Model I are:
Achieve the purpose as
the actor defines it
Win, do not lose
Suppress negative feelings
Emphasize rationality
Primary Strategies
are:
Control environment and
task unilaterally
Protect self and others
unilaterally
Usually operationalized
by:
Unillustrated attributions
and evaluations e.g.. "You seem unmotivated"
Advocating courses of action
which discourage inquiry e.g.. "Lets not talk about the past, that's
over."
Treating ones' own views
as obviously correct
Making covert attributions
and evaluations
Face-saving moves such
as leaving potentially embarrassing facts unstated
Consequences include:
Defensive relationships
Low freedom of choice
Reduced production of valid
information
Little public testing of
ideas
Taken from Argyris,
Putnam & McLain Smith (1985, p. 89)
Chris Argyris looks
to move people from a Model I to a Model II orientation and practice –
one that fosters double-loop learning. He suggests that most people, when asked, will espouse
Model II. As Anderson (1997) has commented, Argyris offers no reason why most people
espouse Model II. In addition, we need to note that the vast bulk of research around the
models has been undertaken by Argyris or his associates.
The significant
features of Model II include the ability to call upon good quality data and to
make inferences. It looks to include the views and experiences of participants rather than
seeking to impose a view upon the situation. Theories should be made explicit and tested,
positions should be reasoned and open to exploration by others. In other words, Model II can
be seen as dialogical
– and more likely to be found in settings and organizations that look to
shared leadership
. It looks to:
Emphasize common goals
and mutual influence.
Encourage open communication,
and to publicly test assumptions and beliefs.
Combine advocacy with inquiry
(Argyris and Schön 1996; Bolman and Deal 1997: 147-8).
We can see these
in the table below.
Model II characteristics
The governing values
of Model II include:
Valid information
Free and informed choice
Internal commitment
Strategies include:
Sharing control
Participation in design
and implementation of action
Operationalized
by:
Attribution and evaluation
illustrated with relatively directly observable data
Surfacing conflicting view
Encouraging public testing
of evaluations
Consequences should
include:
Minimally defensive relationships
High freedom of choice
Increased likelihood of
double-loop learning
Taken from Anderson
1997
As Edmondson and
Moingeon (1999:162) comment, employing Model II in difficult
interpersonal interactions ‘requires profound attentiveness and skill for human beings socialized
in a Model I world’. While they are not being asked to relinquish control altogether, they do
need to share that control.
Organizational learning
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön
suggest that each member of an organization constructs his or
her own representation or image of the theory-in-use of the whole (1978: 16). The picture is
always incomplete – and people, thus, are continually working to add pieces and to get a view
of
the whole. They need to know their place in the organization, it is argued.
An organization is like
an organism each of whose cells contains a particular, partial, changing
image if itself in relation to the whole. And like such an organism, the organization’s practice
stems from those very images. Organization is an artifact of individual ways of representing
organization.
Hence, our inquiry into
organizational learning must concern itself not with static entities called
organizations, but with an active process of organizing which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise.
Individual members are continually engaged in attempting to know the organization, and to
know themselves in the context of the organization. At the same time, their continuing efforts
to know and to test their knowledge represent the object of their inquiry. Organizing is reflexive
inquiry….
[Members] require external
references. There must be public representations of organizational
theory-in-use to which individuals can refer. This is the function of organizational maps. These
are the shared descriptions of the organization which individuals jointly construct and use to
guide their own inquiry….
Organizational theory-in-use,
continually constructed through individual inquiry, is encoded in
private images and in public maps. These are the media of organizational learning. (Argyris and
Schön 1978: 16-17)
With this set of
moves we can see how Chris Argyris and Donald Schön connect up the
individual world of the worker and practitioner with the world of organization. Their focus is
much more strongly on individual and group interactions and defenses than upon systems and
structures (we could contrast their position with that of Peter Senge
1990, for example). By
looking at the way that people jointly construct maps it is then possible to talk about organizational
learning (involving the detection and correction of error) and organizational theory- in-use. For
organizational learning to occur, ‘learning agents’, discoveries, inventions, and evaluations
must be
embedded in organizational memory’ (Argyris and Schön 1978: 19). If it is not encoded in
the
images that individuals have, and the maps they construct with others, then ‘the individual will
have learned but the organization will not have done so’ (op. cit.).
In this organizational
schema single-loop learning is characterized as when, ‘members of the
organization respond to changes in the internal and external environment of the organization by
detecting errors which they then correct so as to maintain the central features of theory-in-use’
(ibid.: 18). Double-loop learning then becomes:
… those sorts of
organizational inquiry which resolve incompatible organizational norms by
setting new priorities and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves
together with associated strategies and assumptions. (Argyris and Schön 1978: 18)
The next step is
to argue that individuals using Model I create Organizational I (O- I) learning
systems. These are characterized by ‘defensiveness, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-fuelling
processes, and escalating error’ (Argyris 1982: 8). O-I systems involve a web of feedback
loops that ‘make organizational assumptions and behavioural routines self-reinforcing –
inhibiting “detection and correction of error” and giving rise to mistrust, defensiveness
and self-
fulfilling prophecy’ (Edmondson and Moingeon 1999:161). In other words, if individuals in an
organization make use of Model I learning the organization itself can begin to function in ways
that act against its long-term interests. Indeed, in a very real sense systems can begin to
malfunction. As Argyris and Schön (1996: 28) put it, ‘The actions we take to promote
productive organizational learning actually inhibit deeper learning’. The challenge is, then,
to
create a rare phenomenon – an Organizational II (O-II) learning system.
Here we come to
the focus of organizational effort – the formulation and implementation of an
intervention strategy. This, according to Argyris and Schön (1978: 220-1) involves the
‘interventionist’ in moving through six phases of work:
|
Phase
1
|
Mapping the
problem as clients see it. This includes the factors and
relationships that define the problem, and the relationship with the living
systems of the organization.
|
|
Phase
2
|
The internalization
of the map by clients. Through inquiry and
confrontation the interventionists work with clients to develop a map for
which clients can accept responsibility. However, it also needs to be
comprehensive.
|
|
Phase
3
|
Test the model.
This involves looking at what ‘testable predictions’ can
be derived from the map – and looking to practice and history to see if
the predictions stand up. If they do not, the map has to be modified.
|
|
Phase
4
|
Invent solutions
to the problem and simulate them to explore
their possible impact.
|
|
Phase
5
|
Produce
the intervention.
|
|
Phase
6
|
Study the impact.
This allows for the correction of errors as well as
generating knowledge for future designs. If things work well under the
conditions specified by the model, then the map is not disconfirmed.
|
By running through
this sequence and attending to key criteria suggested by Model II, it is
argued, organizational development is possible. The process entails looking for the maximum
participation of clients, minimizing the risks of candid participation, starting where people want
to begin (often with instrumental problems), and designing methods so that they value rationality
and honesty.
Conclusion
How are we to evaluate
these models and line of argument? First, we can say that while there
has been a growing research base concerning the models and interventionist strategy, it is still
limited – and people sympathetic to the approach have largely undertaken it. However, as
Peter
Senge’s
experience (recounted at the top of the page) demonstrates, the process and the
focus on
reflection-in-action
does appear to bear fruit in terms of people’s connection with the
exercise and their readiness to explore personal and organizational questions.
Second, it is assumed
that ‘good’ learning ‘takes place in a climate of openness where political
behaviour is minimized’ (Easterby-Smith and Araujo 1999: 13). This is an assumption that can
be questioned. It could be argued that organizations are inherently political – and that it is
important to recognize this. Organizations can be seen as coalitions of various individuals and
interest groups. ‘Organizational goals, structure and policies emerge from an ongoing process
of bargaining and negotiation among major interest groups’ Bolman and Deal 1997: 175).
Thus, perhaps we need to develop theory that looks to the political nature of structures,
knowledge and information. Here we might profitably look to games theory, the contribution of
partisan and political institutions (Beem 1999) and an exploration of how managers can make
explicit, and work with, political processes (Coopey 1998). Perhaps the aim should be ‘to
incorporate politics into organizational learning, rather than to eradicate it’ (Easterby-Smith
and
Araujo 1999: 13).
Third, and this
might be my prejudice, I think we need to be distrustful of bipolar models like
Model I and Model II. They tend to set up an ‘either-or’ orientation. They are useful as
teaching or sensitizing devices, alerting us to different and important aspects of organizational
life, but the area between the models (and beyond them) might well yield interesting alternatives.
Fourth, the interventionist
strategy is staged or phased – and this does bring with it some
problems. Why should things operate in this order. Significantly, this does highlight a tension
between Argyris’s orientation and that of Schön (1983). Schön
in his later work on
reflection-
in- action
draws on his pragmatist heritage (and especially the work of Dewey) and presents the
making of theory-in-action and the expression of professional artistry in a far less linear fashion.
Rather than there being phases, we could argue that intervention of this kind involves a number of
elements or dimensions working at once.
This said, the
theorizing of theory-in-action, the educative power of the models, and the
conceptualization of organizational learning have been, and continue to be, significant
contributions to our appreciation of processes in organizations. The notion of ‘double-loop
learning’ does help us to approach some of the more taken- for-granted aspects of
organizations and experiences. It provides us with a way of naming a phenomenon (and
problem), and a possible way of ‘learning our way out’ (Finger and Asún 2000). Argyris
and
Schön have made a significant contribution to pragmatic learning theory (following in the line
of
Dewey
1933;
Lewin
1948, 1951; and Kolb 1984). First, by introducing the term ‘theory’ or
‘theory in action’, ‘they provide the function of abstract conceptualization (see
experiential
learning
) ‘more structure and more coherence’ (Finger and Asún 2000: 45). Abstract
conceptualization ‘becomes something one can analyze and work from’ (op. cit.). Second,
through the notion of ‘learning-in-action’ Argyris and Schön rework the experiential
learning
cycle.
Unlike Dewey’s, Lewin’s
or Kolb’s learning cycle, where one had, so to speak, to make a
mistake and reflect upon it – that is, learn by trial and error – it is now possible thanks
to
Argyris and Schön’s conceptualization, to learn by simply reflecting critically upon the
theory-in-
action. In other words, it is no longer necessary to go through the entire learning circle in order
to develop the theory further. It is sufficient to readjust the theory through double-loop learning.
(Finger and Asún 2000: 45-6)
This is a very
significant development and has important implications for educators. In the
experiential
learning
model of Kolb (1984) the educator is in essence a
facilitator
of a person’s
learning cycle. To this role can be added that of teacher, coach or mentor, the person who ‘helps
individuals (managers, professionals, workers) to reflect upon their theories-in-action’ (Finger
and
Asún 2000: 46). It is a significant development – but it has gone largely unnoticed in the
adult
education and lifelong learning fields. This is a result, in part, of rather blinkered reading by
professionals and academics within that area, and because Argyris and Schön did not address, to
any significant degree, the arena directly (Argyris’s continued to focus on organization and
management, and Schön’s on professional thinking)
The above materials
were gathered from:
1. Rafael
