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• KM : Definitions
• PKM
• KM : Ecology
• CAS : Overview
• Cog Load : Externalized Cognition
• Kn Networks
• X-Agency Collaboration
• Kn Creation
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• Bibliography.mht
• Quotes

KM : Definitions

• Strat : Von Krogh
  

  Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Strategic role of knowledge (p. 74 ff.) Two categories of knowledge: Public knowledge (explicit knowledge): held by several competitors Technical: shared in reports, engineering drawings, conference publication Application process of public/explicit knowledge can lead to competitive advantage Unique knowledge (tacit knowledge): Held exclusively by the organization Valuable: successfully applied to value-creating tasks (competence), capitalizable for opportunities (f.e. patents) Difficult for competitors to imitate, difficult to substitute (Barney, 1991): tied to personal relations, shared habits, and intuition, all of which are not easily documented Social dimension of tacit knowledge Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Advancement and Knowledge Creation (p. 82 ff.) Step 1: Sharing Tacit Knowledge Tacit knowledge: hard to capture in formal organizational procedures Relies on sharing of experiences and expertise over time between senior employees and novices (mentoring and master-apprentice relationships) deep socialization of a project team (microcommunity of knowledge): understand each other’s definition of shared situations AND agree on a common definition and justified true belief about how to act in a situation Typical ways to share tacit knowledge: Direct observation Direct observation and narration Imitation Experimentation and comparison Joint execution Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Advancement and Knowledge Creation (p. 84 ff.) Step 2: Creating Concepts Attempt to externalize knowledge: from tacit to explicit = results in a new product, process, or service. Express shared practices and judgments through language and the help of knowledge activists: mentally visualize a concept, analyze and coordinate knowledge creation Dummet (1993:151): ‘A language has two functions, as an instrument of communication and as a vehicle of thought.’ Nonaka/Takeuchi (1995): a figurative language using metaphors and analogies is of particular importance for concept creation. Metaphors: as intermediary concepts to expediently use to shape thoughts and communication. Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Advancement and Knowledge Creation (p. 86 ff.) Step 3: Justifying concepts Evaluation by department heads, business heads, top management, external stakeholders, etc. Open dialogue about the concept with constructive criticism and review for its impact on the company’s advancement strategies: the participants  come to believe that the created knowledge is likely to generate a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage. Qualitative evaluation exercise to analyze the future value for the organization of the concept: How does the concept relate to other knowledge, business, products, and markets of the company? Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Advancement and Knowledge Creation (p. 89 ff.) Step 4: Building a Prototype Prototype: a tangible form of the concept, and it is achieved by combining existing concepts, products, components, and procedures with the new concept. Involved are the members of the original microcommunity, marketing, manufacturing, maintenance, and strategic planning. Linear process in which design parameters are given. Revisit earlier steps in order to understand the various meanings attributed to the concept. Tools: database with standardized components, library of best practices in product design and manufacturing, videoconferencing, email exchanges, information about manufacturing, list of competences and products of preferred suppliers, overview of patents Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Advancement and Knowledge Creation (p. 90 ff.) Step 5: Cross-leveling knowledge Outcome: a possible product/service innovation or raw knowledge Prototype itself displays knowledge in the physical form of drawings, specifications, or models, and it can be passed on to pilot manufacturing, full-scale manufacturing, distribution, and sales. = a source of inspiration across organizational hierarchies and for other business areas, markets, or microcommunities developing their own products and service offerings. Process results in the creation of organizational capital: assembled experiences related to a concrete prototype, to the very process of working together, the methods applied, and a variety of different concepts. Von Krogh/Ichijo/Nonaka (2000): Scandia’s Future Center (http://www.skandia.com/en/index/) Skandia: Sweden, a global corporation engaged in insurance and financial services, 10,000 employees, 80% of shareholders are Non-Swedish investors 1980: a knowledge-intensive service company’s competitive strength would rely on intangible factors like individual talent, synergetic market relationships, and the ability to manage the flow of employee competences and skills. Identified its knowledge sources as a strategic priority. Swedish Coalition of Service Industries, CEO Leif Edvinsson: develop new measurement tools and visualize intellectual capital as a complement of the balance sheet. Intellectual Capital: Human capital: individual capabilities (talents, knowledge, experiences) Structural capital: infrastructure that supports the company’s human capital, including information technology and physical systems used to transmit intellectual capital

  
  

  
   
• Strat : Hansen/Nohria/Tierney
  

  Hansen/Nohria/Tierney (1999) What’s your strategy for managing knowledge? (I) Codification strategy Knowledge is carefully codified and stored in databases, where it can be accessed and used easily by anyone in the organization. ‘people-to-documents’ approach: knowledge is extracted from the person who developed it, made independent from the person: allows people to search for and retrieve codified knowledge without having to contact the person who originally developed it Hansen/Nohria/Tierney (1999) What’s your strategy for managing knowledge? (II) Personalization strategy Knowledge is closely tied to the person who developed it and is shared mainly through direct person-to-person contacts: focus on dialogue between individuals Chief purpose of computers: help people to communicate Knowledge transfer mechanisms: brainstorming sessions one-on-one conversations knowledge networks transferring people between offices supporting a culture in which actors are expected to return calls from colleagues promptly creating directories of experts Usually organizations use both approaches, but effective organizations excelled by focusing on one of the strategies and using the other in a supporting role. Hansen/Nohria/Tierney (1999): What’s your strategy for managing knowledge? (III)

  
  

  
   
• Global : World Bank
  

  Problem: World Bank Group: an unmatched source of development experience and best practice; Wolfensohn: “Knowledge was not always easily accessible to those who need it – inside and outside the bank – when they need it, or in format they find useful and accessible. As a result, the effectiveness of our service suffers.” 1996: the bank’s information technology (IT) infrastructure would not support the type of knowledge management required to implement the foregoing vision: duplication and fragmentation of data created serious business problems. Solution: Knowledge Bank: a world-class repository of development experience and knowledge that would benefit all entities that did business with the bank. How should or could management gain control over IT investments and minimize fragmentation? What were the obstacles to reform and how could they be overcome? How might the World Bank derive the greatest return from its above average IT investment in a time of cost pressure? What was the role of IT in supporting the Knowledge vision? Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (II) The Central Information Technology Function 1971 first “Computing Activities Department” to centralize all programming 1982: information was a resource to be managed by line managers, like budget and staff; “Information resource management” strategy: create a bankwide IT strategy failed 1986-1993: Information, Technology and Facilities 1994: IT functions merged with the organizational planning department: Organization and Business Practices” 1996: Information Technology Services (ITS), $72 million budget, employed 432 staff, 151 regular and 192 nonregular staff and 89 contractors. The Legacy of Decentralization No overall design consistency; No one source of information to know what databases there are; Mid 1990s: more than 100 data interfaces linked the bank’s various operational, management, and accounting systems Extensive night-time batch processing needed to refresh the multiplicity of data bases limited the time data was available IT expenditures were not clearly accounted for across the institution Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (III) Cross-Institutional Systems 1984 - Management Information System (MIS): for senior management Management reporting system to provide a comprehensive picture of lending activity, loan performance, internal expenditures and labor costs – every line unit was required to input information into the system. Located in the Office of the Senior Vice President of Operations 1991 - Senior Vice President of Operations was eliminated; Systems development group in operations moved to the Operations Policy and Research Department (OPRIS) Proving information to senior management One-way communication vehicles for feeding information to bank management Provided little value to those most directly responsible for producing results, the bank’s 2,000 task managers Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (IV) Talking about IT Central IT function was successively paired with facilities, organizational planning and change management departments reflected its continuing struggle to understand and define the role of IT in its business strategy Failure of IMTPC Information Management Technology Policy Committee It was set up in the context of autonomy promoted by 1987 reorganization; IMTPC members had vastly different levels of understanding of IT issues. The Enterprise Network (EN) Rollout 1994-1995: a new area of cooperation among the parts of the IS community at the bank; Common goal: create a network that would support nearly all parts of the community; Challenging obstacles: technological difficulties tied to overcoming poor communications infrastructure in most of the bank’s countries of operations; political issues involved in getting approval from each country for establishing the links; Internal struggles around funding mechanisms. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (V) The Governance Issue 1996: IT was made a line responsibility to avoid the creation of a new vice presidency 1997: senior management empowered a committee composed of IT and non-IT managers with the authority and commission to help solve IM problems IMG Information Management Group, Chairmanship of Muhsin without any knowledge of technology A New Role for ITS What is it that we need to do? Bridge the gulf between technology people and business users Different levels of technology use and investment across units at the bank represented a major challenge Launch of a complete review of the department and the IT at the bank: retained highly respected companies to establish benchmarks, survey users, and review Systems architecture to create a baseline. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (VI) User Feedback 1996: user survey characterized the level of end user versus systems provider hostility as “not healthy” and higher than average. Surveyed users wanted ITS to: Anticipate the technology needs for users Provide solutions to business needs of users Provide integrated team responses to business needs/problems of users Coordinate and communicate activities involving different ITS units Develop an ongoing two-way communication channel between ITS and users Provide one contact point for problem resolution Don’t the buck Responding to this needs required a new profile and leadership role of ITS The December 1996 Diagnosis Systems Architecture Review 1996 by Ernst & Young: Plurality should not be assumed without necessity; It is not what you know you do not know that hurts you, it is what you do not know you do not know; It must be dangerous to handle than to bring about a new order of things. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (VII) 1997 IMG objectives for all bank IM initiatives Reform the bank’s operational and administration information systems; Bring the bank and its clients into closer partnership through an aggressive deployment of global connectivity and network information systems. Become the “Knowledge Bank” by putting in place knowledge-sharing solutions and tools to support collaborate on. Build the capacity of the IM function to rapidly develop and implement innovative business solutions in partnership with the core businesses to leverage the bank’s business strategy. Simplify, simplify, simplify 1997 ITT’s mission:  “deliver integrated information technology solutions and services that add value to the business and mission of the bank. In the course of delivering these services, we will create strategic alliances and partnerships with all our clients.” Three central goals: Commit the bank to moving aggressively toward sensible, business-driven standardization at the desktop Train “our business people to be able to use the information systems in the bank directly in their workplace and in part to guarantee a return on our investments”; “Systems Retrieval” iniatives: modernizing and getting consistent data; moving away from legacy systems to commercial applications whenever possible. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (A) (VIII) From Technology to Information … and Knowledge Ultimate goal of System Renewal: creation and extension of the enterprise network and all the other activities under way at ITS; provide the foundations to build the “Knowledge Bank” Tools to enable information sharing, permit more effective collaborative work, and harness the power of 50 years of development experience and knowledge to carry out the mission. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (B) (I) 1997: Announcement of a new IT oversight committee – The information and Knowledge Management Council – and a new IT governance structure ISG Information Solutions Group: nearly all IT groups were direct line responsibility of a single officer Program Director for Knowledge Management (KM) - Eight core activities: Enterprise KMS Who knows what Help desks Sector statistics Engagement information Dialogue space Best practices External access Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (B) (II) Appropriate incentive system to encourage information sharing: Create a horizontal “organic” relationship among all Bank staff that shared a common expertise to foster sharing experiences and knowledge in the organization; Use technology to enable our staff to share knowledge faster and more efficiently Requires active participation and support from all. “Strengthening Our Information and Knowledge Management”: Renewal of information systems will help to improve the way we do business internally, whether at headquarters or in the field; Enable us to improve the quality of our services and our capacity to share the lessons of global development and best practice; Focus on strategic priorities and allocate resources: establish a Bank Group-wide Information and Knowledge Management Council Chief Information Officer (CIO): for consolidation of information management and technology activities – to ensure that efforts in individual units are aligned with institutional priorities and to ensure more effective stewardship of substantial investments in this area. Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (B) (III) CIO Align better information technology resources with business strategies; Ensure that we can provide much-needed interim solutions to front-line operations – including in the field – while substantially completing over the next two-and-a-half years the complex systems renewal program; Real partnership between the CIO and all operational units; Renewal of financial systems: streamline processes and integrity of the processing of financial transactions continues to be ensured through proper control; Ensure that a systematic approach is taken to the professional development of information and technology management staff; Substantive task of managing content will, of course, rest with the relevant units in the Bank – especially the Networks and DEC. Move forward to establish institution-wide service standards; Forge agreements with Vice Presidencies on the specific agreements for level of support and investment; Establish dotted-line reporting relationships between senior information managers and Vice Presidencies to ensure that the latter receive integrated solutions and quality service Restructure the existing working-level groups governing information and technology, and create a broadly representative advisory body to operationalize knowledge management Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (B) (IV) Information Solutions Business Solutions: focus on integrating systems, knowledge and information Strategic Partnerships: sustained business partnerships, collaboratively developing comprehensive client assistance strategies Strategic Partnership Programs of the Information Solutions Group Decentralization and Field Office Support Deliver a truly global network Improved Support for Core Operations in the field Knowledge-Sharing Program Information Support Targeted Primarily at Core Operations Implementation of the Knowledge Management System System Renewal Program Interim Solutions Easier-to-Use Applications Interface Long-term Solutions Cost Effectiveness Implementation Program Information at the World Bank: In Search of a Technology Solution (B) (V) Institutional Information Kiosk ISG Information Solutions Group: Six groups under the CIO’s office (ITS, CTRIS, OPRIS, HRSIS, and systems staff from PBD and GSD) Anchor a new Information Solutions Network (ISG): responsible for professional development, management of information skill mix and for the promotion of professional interactions; Information and Knowledge Management Council (IKMC): ensure the Bank Group fully leverages its investments in systems, information, technology, and knowledge management. Four programs: Decentralization and field support; Knowledge Sharing Support; Systems Renewal; Cost Effectiveness.

  
  

  
   
• Jet Propulsion
  

  Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (I) Need for knowledge management: 40%of JPL’s science and engineering workforce is currently eligible for retirement = most experienced project managers of Apollo In four years, half of NASA’s entire workforce will be eligible. Radically reduced budgets, missions have multiplied ten-fold. Struggled to find the right balance between mission performance and cutting-edge space exploration U.S. congress called on NASA to develop appropriate knowledge management tools to reduce the risk of future mission failures and to address impending retirements (2000) KM tools were only information management systems Holcomb: IT systems alone could not fully address NASA’s mandate = don’t address the knowledge from one mission to another. Assessing risk in designing aircraft spacecraft components is one of the most difficult task = novices can learn this only from experienced engineers and scientists, or trial and error => Shift in culture in the way experiential knowledge is cultivated and managed. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (II) NASA background 1957, the former Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first man-made satellite to orbit the Earth. 1958, U.S. Congress established NASA. NASA: assembled from several existing federal agencies and organizations: National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Langley Aeronautical Laboratory Ames Aeronautical Laboratory Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory Jet Propulsion Laboratory Army Ballistic Missile Agency Naval Research Laboratory Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (III) The Apollo Era – Mission to the Moon 1961: J.F. Kennedy “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth.” Federal funding for the Moon project: 1960 $500 million -> 1965 $5.2 billion (= 5.3% of federal budget) Cost for a roundtrip mission to the Moon: $20 billion ($179 billion in 2001 dollars) Experience managing small-scale research projects, but had little experience managing large-scale projects and operations. Apollo program office at its D.C. headquarters, imported an Air Force management group that had supervised the Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program. Centers became more dependent on private industry and headquarters. July 1969: Armstrong and Aldrin first humans to land on the Moon and return safely home. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (IV) Post-Apollo Era 1970: Congress funded the Space Shuttle, but cut NASA’s overall budget in half. Several projects during the 1970’s: Skylab, Apollo-Soyez Test Project, Project Viking, and Project Voyager. 1977: NASA began building a fleet of four reusable space shuttles increased outsourcing to private industry Resisted advancing technology Streamlined management Adopted commercial-style business practices Most experienced engineers became involved more with integration and contractor oversight and less with design. 1981: first shuttle, Columbia, as a sign of continued American superiority in space technology 1982: Shuttle program was “operational” – i. e., ready to begin routine flights Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (V) 1985: NASA planned to launch nine shuttle missions and projected an annual rate of 24 flights by 1990 1986: Shuttle Challenger exploded – Shuttle program was grounded for more than 2.5 years as NASA reviewed the Shuttle’s management, design and manufacture. “We’re really in a mess.” “Low morale and frustration is the description of the U.S. space program.” Corrective measures: executive Shuttle team board reviewed technical specifications, not only budgets, 1888: Shuttle Endeavor launched and returned safely to Earth. 1990: NASA sent the first of its four great space observations into orbit, $3 billion Hubble Telescope, with a flawed mirror that could have been detected and fixed prior to launch. 1992: NASA was assigned a new administrator, Daniel Goldin As cost became a high-priority, missions were subject to cancellation if budget exceeded their targets by as little as 15%. “Faster”: a compressed development and launch schedule for all FBC projects: => influenced how quickly knowledge could be transferred from one mission to the next. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (VI) What happened with FBC Initial results were promising: $260 million Mars Pathfinder spacecraft and its Sojourner rover successfully explored the surface of Mars during the summer of 1997, returning stunned photographs of the planet. Anthony Spear, project manager for the mission: team thought that they had thrown away the rulebook and that this was faster, better, cheaper. But Spear had his finger very closely on the whole process. Jet Propulsion Lab 2001 budget of $1.3 billion, staff of 5,500: widely recognized world-leading aerospace and robotics research institution Successful unmanned missions to planets in the solar system Operated much like a university with independent departments, competition for talent among project teams, highly competent, achievement-oriented personnel Two cultural factors: “not-invented here” attitude: project components developed outside of JPL were viewed with more suspicion than those created at JPL Competition for talent: informally ranked as Team A, B, and C players – “A-team” staff had the highest talent levles. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (VII) Stretched Thin JPL projects jumped from four to 40 within the space of five years Take some really junior folks and put them into relatively senior positions: learn their trade on the job, with little help from the most experienced staffers 80- to 90-hour workweeks In the late 1990s and into the 2000, people were retiring and experienced personnel were leaving for Internet companies, a process called the “Dot-gone Syndrome” Most experienced scientists and engineers went to the largest projects – leaving fewer experienced scientists and engineers to head, staff and review small-scale projects => with the most experienced personnel unevenly distributed across projects, both operations and design suffered. Lack of experienced personnel affected mission design Short-changing the Future With demands to cut costs and maximize mission performance, decisions favored present over future missions. Using (Ignoring) the Past Program managers and project leaders differed over the significance of knowledge capture and its uses. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (VIII) Call for Better Knowledge Management (FBC Reviewed) Several recurring problems with FBC: Failed 1999 Mars missions were at least 30% under-funded Mission engineers were forced to work 60 hours a week or more => little time to recheck their work in the painstaking way they would have preferred Environment where increasing time and budget pressures broke down lines of communication and prevented people from internalizing and applying previous lessons “We need to slow down some, not rush too quickly into important programs and projects, plan and implement them more carefully, and move away from fixations on costs and near-term gain.” (Holm) Impact of Impending Retirements Risk management assessment: less experienced team leaders may take a lot longer to come to an answer to a problem, or to an issue. Losing experienced personnel would lead to the loss of knowledge that would be not only difficult to capture, but useful for future missions Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (IX) Knowledge Management at NASA Agency-wide knowledge management initiative to cultivate a more open technical culture and garner political support. No formal process for transferring knowledge from people who are leaving high-level management positions: about 75% of retirees remained available to the agency as consultants Challenges facing the space agency: How do we successfully transfer information gleaned from one mission to other missions and across generations of people who come in and out of the agency? How do we get hugely diverse, geographically distributed communities to work together on complex space missions? How do we manage the knowledge that we already have? Develop a strategy based on a performance-oriented definition of knowledge management: “Knowledge management is getting the right information to the right people at the right time, and helping people create knowledge and share and act upon information in ways that will measurably improve the performance of NASA and its partners.” Capturing tacit knowledge of our workforce and effecting cultural changes to share. Leonard/Kiron (2002): Managing knowledge and learning at NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (X) Knowledge Management at NASA (cont’d) Three-pronged set of initiatives: Improving documentation – The Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) Developing a Web-based Portal Academy of Program and Project Leadership (APPL) Moving Forward Team members do not seem to understand the significance of the knowledge loss issues: we want to be able to reuse the knowledge from components of that mission, and we can’t because we never captured it. Most experienced personnel are about to leave the agency is recognized at the highest level: create a virtual presence of these individuals – their management styles, decisions, and decision-making – on the Internet. Some initiatives need senior-level support, such as expanding our mentoring programs, creating oral histories, and creating the time and incentives for mentoring Begin the cross-agency cultural changes necessary to make this work: need for a larger budget Fail to make the argument for cultural change, we will lose credibility and delay the needed change.

  
  

  
   
• Tec : Davenport |Prusack
  
  1. 
     

  Davenport/Prusak: Technologies for Knowledge Management (Chapt. 7) (I) Expert systems and artificial intelligence Typically concentrated on managing narrow domains of knowledge such as configurations of computers or the diagnosis of a particular type of disease Overly high expectations and excessive levels of hype. CBR case-based reasoning (McDonnell Douglas): extracting of knowledge from a series of narratives, or cases, about the problem domain => can reflect the fluid thinking that goes on in our minds. Implementing knowledge technologies Focus on technologies that capture, store, and distribute structured knowledge for use by people. Goal: to take knowledge that exists in human heads and paper documents, and make it available throughout the organization. Different roles of people: some technologies involve broad participation, some only a few individuals. Level of knowledge required to successfully use a particular technology Time required to find a knowledge management solution in a particular business application of a tool. Davenport/Prusak: Technologies for Knowledge Management (Chapt. 7, p. 131) (II): Key dimensions of Knowledge Management Tools Davenport/Prusak: Technologies for Knowledge Management (Chapt. 7, p. 131) (III) Broad Knowledge Repositories: Structured, explicit knowledge – usually in document form, f. e. Lexis/Nexis, Dialog. Hypertext allows related content to be linked regardless to its physical location Problem: systems solve the problem of locating knowledge by judging the knowledge that is being provided Examples: Notes, Hoover, GrapeVINE A good thesaurus is essential to most on-line knowledge repositories: text search-and-retrieval Focused knowledge environments Constraint-based systems: suited for situations with high levels of data but normally less quantitative data that than required by neural networks Suited for relative narrow problem domains (f. e. product configuration) Davenport/Prusak: Technologies for Knowledge Management (Chapt. 7, p. 131) (IV) Real-Time Knowledge Systems f. e. SolutionBuilder: Classify knowledge about the problem received from the customer, or add new knowledge about the problem Components: Goal, fact, symptom, change, cause, negation, fix the problem Longer-term analysis systems Neural network: statistically oriented tool that excels at using data to classify cases into one category of another Require a lot of (quantitative) data and a high-powered computer “black box”: it’s not easy to explain why they did what they did. What technologies can’t do Limitations: knowledge management cannot take place without extensive behavioral, cultural and organizational change.

  
  

  
   
• Garvin: Learn in Action
  

  Case: Software for the Soldier. KSG case. Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (I). U.S. Army’s Center of Lessons Learned (CALL) Initial role was to capture lessons from the National Training Centers, where troops engage in long, simulates battles to test their readiness and skills. Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti: CALL observation teams are among the first troops on the ground in any Army operation: Collect on-the-spot information about new practices and techniques identify problems and trouble spots, distinguish approaches that work from those that do not, and share their findings with others. Heart of the Center: real-time observations and data collection. Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (II). CALL divisions Lessons Learned Division: develops and disseminates lessons from actual operations, major exercises Combat Training Center Information Systems Division: supports CALL’s hardware and software Research Division: designs and maintains CALL’s database and document storage Foreign Military Studies Office: produces high-quality military security assessments University After Next Division: provides best practices and technologies from public, academic, private and military sectors to the Army. Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (III). Determine “critical information requirements”: What do you need to know to be more effective in the future? What operations are pending that will impose new demands on soldiers? What kinds of decisions will commanders face that they have not faced before? ð     Identify appropriate missions. Form collections teams: Varying in size, depending on the task Every team relies heavily on the borrowed manpower. Headed by a line officer from an outside unit, selected by his/her rank, credibility, and access to the group being observed. Second supporting leader, skilled in observation and collection, is drawn form CALL. Several member of CALL’s Lessons Learned Division Additional experts recruited from various military schools Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (IV). Specialized experts: Able to contribute immediately to units in the field: are a help rather than a hindrance, with valuable knowledge to impart; Overcome the natural suspicion that often prevents observers from becoming insiders; Knowledge sharing becomes a two-way street Obtain information and insights that would not otherwise be available. Collection plan: Structured hierarchically, with a few overarching themes at the top and a large group of focused topics below Issues: broad areas that Army leaders have identified as targets of learning Subissues: functions and tasks that fall under a broader theme and map directly into the categories of the Army’s Blueprint of the Battlefield, a generic process model that fits all operations; Questions: specify the precise areas where data must be collected and observations must be made Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (V). In the field Data collection: observe events on the spot and in real time Supplement their observations with interviews, briefings, photographs, videotapes, written reports Focus on emerging problems and unexpected difficulties “Threading the needle”: tap additional sources of information Rapid information sharing: quick fixes and warnings, evening briefings, as important part of CALL’s role = enhances credibility and provides an immediate payoff to units in the field. Notes/observations are sent electronically to the CALL headquarters for review Coded in the categories of the Blueprint of the Battlefield (standardized indexing and retrieval system) New lessons can often be accessed through CALL’s Web site within days Garvin (2000a): “The U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned: Not Making the Same Mistake Twice,” pp. 83-90 (VI). At the end of the assignment: Collection teams return to CALL headquarters Prepare an Initial Impressions report: summarizes the most important lessons Later, additional bulletins, newsletters, handbooks are developed for dissemination throughout the Army CALL observers participate personally in knowledge transfer: temporarily join up with replacement units, communicate lessons directly, and contribute to training scenarios developed from observations in the field. ð    See Table 3-5 for an overview of CALL’s approach as a model of effective learning. Garvin (2000b): “The U.S. Army’s After Action Reviews: Seizing the Chance to Learn,” pp. 106-116 (I). After Action Reviews (AARs) Originally designed to capture lessons from the simulated battles of the National Training Centers Turning point: 1st Gulf War – small groups of soldiers gathered together, in foxholes or around vehicles in the middle of the desert, to review their most recent missions and identify possible improvements Haiti, first time, AARs were incorporated into all phases of the operation and were used extensively to capture and disseminate critical organizational knowledge. Technique of AARs Striking resemblance to “Chalk talks” in sports: designed to make learning routine and to create “a state of mind where everybody is continuously assessing themselves, their units, and their organizations and asking how they can improve. All participants meet immediately after an important activity or event to review their assignments, identify successes and failures, and look for ways to perform better the next time around. Garvin (2000b): “The U.S. Army’s After Action Reviews: Seizing the Chance to Learn,” pp. 106-116 (II). Four Questions: What did we set out to do? What actually happened? Why did it happen? What are we going to do next time? =>    25% of the time for the first two question, 25% to the third, 50% to the fourth. Pooling information from diverse, objective sources at the National Training Center: Observer-controllers: skilled, experienced soldiers who shadow individual officers throughout their training exercises, provide on-the-spot coaching and lead AARs. Technology: instrumentation and taping – provides and addition source of objective information, extremely detailed report, leaves little room for argument Ensure that facts are reconstructed with considerable accuracy: pooling multiple perspectives in a process that resembles “majority rules”. Minimize memory losses: AARs must be conducted as soon after the event as practical – preferably the same day. Garvin (2000b): “The U.S. Army’s After Action Reviews: Seizing the Chance to Learn,” pp. 106-116 (III). Diagnosis: Asking for an examination of cause and effect: tease out the underlying reasons for success or failure. Answering the questions requires problem-solving skills, as well as a willingness to accept responsibility: brainstorm possible explanations and find ways to choose among several plausible alternatives (ruthlessly honest). Deciding what to do next is often inseparable from diagnosis. Identify areas where groups are performing well and should stay the course. Prerequisites for successful AARs: Skilled facilitation to guide the discussion from beginning to end, ensuring that participants stay on track. Feedback if commanders are willing to publicly acknowledge their flaws. Support straight talk. Tact and Civility. Follow a well-defined path

  
  

  
   
• Leonard: Kn Wellsprings
  

  Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (I) Knowledge reservoirs in organizations are not static pools but wellsprings, constantly replenished with streams of new ideas and constituting an ever-flowing source of corporate knowledge. Chaparral Steel: A knowledge-based organization An organic learning system: CEO Forward: show them almost “everything and we will be giving away nothing because they can’t take it home with them” knowledge management in organization is comprehensive only as an organic whole Continuous flux, constantly self-regenerating Explicitly stated strategic vision: “We constantly chip away the ground we stand on. We have to keep out front all the time.” Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (II) Knowledge-Building Activities: Activities: create a firm’s capabilities Knowledge is created and nurtured through certain characteristic activities. Combining people’s distinct individualities with a particular set of activities: combination enables innovation. Four primary learning activities create and control knowledge necessary for its current and future operations: Shared, creative problem solving (to produce current products) Implementing and integrating new methodologies and tools (to enhance internal operations) Formal and informal experimentation (to build capabilities for the future) Pulling in expertise from outside Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (III) Knowledge-Creating and –Diffusing Activities (p. 9) Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (IV) Shared Problem solving Progress must be everyone’s business – not just the province of a few specialists Any employee will willingly apply his/her intelligence to the problem until it is solved Ability to move knowledge in all directions – up, down across – minimize both vertical and horizontal barriers Integrating new technologies and methodologies Innovation accompanies implementing new tools Decisions about production methodologies are pushed down to the lowest possible supervisory level, “where the knowledge is.” Improvements are immediately enacted, with no wait for management approval or standardization of “best practices”. Work is structured with the objective of disseminating knowledge. Constant formal and informal experimenting No separate R&D facility No formal requirement for a certain number of suggestions Ad hoc, inexpensive, and unscientific experimentation Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (V) Pulling in expertise from outside Constantly benchmark and scan the world for technical expertise: assuring through extensive searches that no available system will suit their needs. Invest in unorthodox knowledge-gathering mechanisms, f. e. cosponsoring a research conference about a new alloy under investigation Skills and Physical Technical Systems at Chaparral Although most of the knowledge is tacit, in people’s heads, it is also embedded in superior physical equipment and systems Managerial Systems at Chaparral Evolved to enable and reward learning Employees are carefully selected: potential, attitude toward learning, and their enthusiasm Compensation structure embodies respect for the contribution of each individual No time clocks Bonus schemes are linked to company profiles: 93% of employees own 3% of the stocks Formal and informal educational programs Informal practices such as “vicing” Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (VI) Underlying Values at Chaparral Incentive and educational systems are supported by a strong set of very clear and consistent values Values critical to creating a learning environment: Respect for the individual Tolerance of failure Openness to ideas from outside Chaparral’s Interdependent System Continuous learning and knowledge accumulation depend on the sense of ownership derived from the incentive system, on the pride of accomplishment gained from special educational systems, on values embedded in policies and managerial practices, as well as on specific technical skills. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (VII    ) The Essence of Core Capabilities     Certain core capabilities bestow a competitive advantage on a company: distinctive, firm-specific, organizational competencies, resource deployments or invisible assets The Locus of Core Capabilities Reside at any line-of-business level Activities that create and channel knowledge The Nature of Core Technological Capabilities System of activities, physical systems, skills and knowledge bases, managerial systems of education and reward, and values that create a special advantage for a company or line of business Systems are supplemental, enabling, or core Multidimensional systems only on of whose dimensions is wholly or principally technical in nature Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” p. 19 (VIII) Dimensions of Core Capabilities Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (IX) Skills and Knowledge Base Encompasses both techniques specific to the firma and scientific understanding T-shaped: both very deep (the stem of the T) yet broad enough (the cross of the T) to enable their possessors to explore the interfaces between their particular knowledge domain and various applications of that knowledge in particular products Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (X) Physical Technical Systems A portion of knowledge and skills integrated from publics, industry-specific, and firm-specific know-how has been embedded in proprietary and protected form: f.e. patents Tacit knowledge of various experts, structured and codified over time, becomes embedded in software, hardware, and accepted procedures. Technical systems preserve the knowledge of individuals who have moved on to other functions, other jobs, other organizations. Constitute a longer-lived dimension of a core capability Managerial Systems Organized routines guiding resource accumulation and deployment, f. e. combination of mill-specific information and general education will be difficult to imitate. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 1: “Core Capabilities” (XI) Values and Norms Skills and knowledge, both embodied in people and embedded in physical systems as well as managerial systems all exhibit a particular character pending on what is valued in the company. Generic values: they apply to human interactions within the corporation in general or to a general outlook on life. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (I) The Pathology of Core Rigidities Built through the same activities that create core capabilities The management determines whether they foster or inhibit the unimpeded flow of critical knowledge. Insularity: Flip/dark side of core capabilities is revealed due to external events New competitors figure out a better way to serve the firm’s customers New technologies emerge Political or social events shift the ground underneath Overshooting the target: Succumbing to the simplistic notion that more of a good thing is always better. Formerly beneficial activities are carried so far that they hamper rather than help. Downward trajectories: success leads to specialization and exaggeration, to confidence and complacency, to dogma and ritual. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (II) Why is it so easy for core capabilities to become core rigidities: Alternative explanations Economics: attacking core rigidities often means undermining the current economic foundations of the firm – cannibalizing current product lines, making obsolete current knowledge bases and skills, lessening the value of current assets. Politics of power: Altering current capabilities may dislodge organizational royalty from their thrones atop of functional, market-based, or other fiefdoms. Behavioral explanation: organizational routines are ingrained, and various forms of habit govern. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (III) Knowledge-Inhibiting Activities Limited Problem-Solving Path-dependencies: decisions and events from the past intrude on the present and shape the future – the footsteps of the past cannot be undone; actions in the present are influenced by the paths followed to get there. Alternatives don’t occur to employees: people have a natural selection bias toward the familiar in designing new products. Managers must actively encourage people to break from the past. Inability to innovate with new tools and methods Internal hardening of organizational arteries can cause paralysis even if people within a company recognize the need for process innovation and strive mightily to bring it about. Limited Experimentation Limited when knowledge extension flows along well-worn paths rather than creating new options for the corporation. Screening out external knowledge Channels through which external knowledge must flow, may be heavily biased toward the types of knowledge already known to feed core capabilities Unchecked and unexamined predilections toward existing core capabilities can choke off enriching knowledge from unexpected sources. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (IV) Knowledge-Inhibiting Activities (p. 36) Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (V) Variation in Resistance to Change: The Four Dimensions of Core Rigidities Addressing Core Rigidities Turnaround situations: Organization has fully ossified, and most of its former capabilities are outdated; managers must completely rebuild and renew the organization: creative destruction of old core capabilities. Challenging changes, because like core capabilities, core rigidities comprise a system. Physical Systems: Tools and Methodologies New equipment or new software programs can be purchased off the shelf: the more innovation is fully embodied in the equipment and requires little user training, the more easily it is accepted. Alterations in technical systems are some of the most visible and most easily understood changes managers can make. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (VI) Managerial Systems Grow up in a company to encourage and reward the accretion of particular kinds of knowledge and to bestow status on certain functions, disciplines, and roles, other skills and knowledge are shortchanged by those same systems. Skills and knowledge Altering skills and knowledge base of a core capability is as simple and devastatingly difficult as hiring new people => depends of the different types of knowledge required (public, industry-specific, firm-specific) Attacks on outdated skills often seem almost immoral to longtime employees because knowledge bases are tied up with norms of behavior and implicit value systems. Values Generic values: associated with attitudes and beliefs about relations with other people, incl. customers. Knowledge-base-specific values: tied to prizing particular ways of carrying out activities, with specific disciplinary approaches or with certain ways of operating. Bear the “imprint” of company founders and early leaders: employees are uncertain whether they are being asked to alter the big V or whether the change involves only the way in which existing values are being operationalized. Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (VII) Leonard (1998): Wellsprings of Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Chapter 2: “Core Rigidities” (VIII) Susceptibility of Core Rigidity Dimensions to Change (p. 45) KSG Case MCS2: Software for the Soldier (I) Maneuver Control System Version 2 (MCS2): Provide commanding officers with the elusive Holy Grail of war making: timely, accurate information about the war’s progress. Crucial information, such as location of troops on the battlefield needed to command and control forces. Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA): develop the computer system in close coordination with the soldiers who would be the first to use MCS2 (equal partner approach). Backgrounds: Origins: 1970s U.S. Army began to change its strategy for waging war – planning for regional wars (such as in Vietnam): Help the 9th Division (High Technology Division) locating, testing and procuring new equipment the Army established a new organization (located at Fort Lewis). Improving Command and Control: 9th Division needed an automated command and control system for directing, coordinating and controlling his forces in battle: a complex set of task consisting primarily of gathering, analyzing and communicating information about what was occurring on, and around, the battlefield. 1980s: the ACCS was almost completely manual: main tools available to commanders for managing a battle were maps, acetate map overlays, grease pencils, clipboards, paper, typewriters, radio teletypes, two-way radios, telephones and couriers. G-Staff – additional staff officers – whose duties were divided among personnel (G1), intelligence (G2), operations (G3), logistics (G4), and civil affairs (G5) – with special functional areas within the each G-Staff. Manual system encouraged a potentially dangerous centralization of equipment and personnel.

  
  

  
   
• Tacit Extrinsic : Leonard
  

  Leonard. 2000. "Tacit Knowledge, Unarticulated Needs, and Empathic Design in New Product Development," How to understand market needs – When the customers don’t know what they know Knowledge: information that is relevant, actionable, and at least partially based on experience Two knowledge sources: Organization (knowledge of what is possible) Marketplace (knowledge of what is needed) The limits of inquiry Generally, asking people what they want: Careful inquiry can lead to uncovering some highly complicated desires that may be difficult, but possible to articulate; People don’t know what their opinion or attitude is, because they have never experienced what you are asking about; Usability laboratories Watch the actual behavior of people interacting with your product Laboratory situation is still artificial (time-constrained, zoo-like quality of the experiment) Leonard. 2000. "Tacit Knowledge, Unarticulated Needs, and Empathic Design in New Product Development," “Concept engineering” Learn details that arose during the telling of the experience-based stories; Makes explicit some of their tacit knowledge about the context in which a product is used. Empathic design Various processes used by top engineering/design firms and a few forward-looking manufacturers; a) observation of potential or actual customers in their natural settings; b) over time if members are well-acquainted with the knowledge base of the organization providing the product or service; Tacit knowledge is untapped by direct inquiry, because people are unaware of their own behavior, or at least of how their behavior offers opportunities for improvement and change. Leonard. 2000. "Tacit Knowledge, Unarticulated Needs, and Empathic Design in New Product Development," Triggers of Use What situations prompt customers to use a particular product or service? Discover behaviors which are largely unconscious. Interactions with the user’s environment Some of the users systems had evolved according to implicit decision rules that are unlikely to emerge in surveys, focus groups or usability laboratories. User customization Users often come up with innovations: Rubbermaid Intangible attributes of the product Emotional, psychological and aesthetic attributes that may not be readily articulated by potential users (f.e. Coca Cola). Unarticulated user needs Needs buried in patterns of behavior observed over time.

  
  

  
   
• KM : 10 Lessons
  Ten Lessons Learned in the Literature:

   

  
  Effective knowledge management systems have specific users who demand specific data to inform decisions for which they are held accountable.

  
  The sustained commitment of ministry leadership is directly tied to the sustainability of a knowledge management system.  As initial ?champions? become distracted or disenchanted, the odds of the knowledge management system effort stalling increase.

  
  Incentives in developing countries to use objective information tend to be weak.  Other criteria (e.g. securing funding, rewarding supports) may be more important in determining the success of a manager or a policymaker.  Frequently, the absence of reliable data can be to the advantage of the potential user. Knowledge management system users tend to contribute and use information when there are rewards for doing so.

  
  Donors often overestimate client demand for knowledge management systems.  These misconceptions often take the form of: ?The demand for a good knowledge management is always there ? the only things lacking are the means,? or ?If given the information, decision-making will be rational.?

  
  Knowledge management systems tend to be over-designed.  Systems with the highest use and downstream adaptation tend to be simple and modest in scope.  Similarly, knowledge management system design tends to be burdened by unrealistic expectations about the degree of precision ?required? without taking into account precision?s high costs.

  
  In most cases, more information is collected that actually analyzed and applied toward decision-making. Knowledge management reform should focus first only on information that directly informs priority decisions.

  
  Effective systems tend to build-off of existing databases, taking advantage of current data collection routines.  Maintaining familiarity while enhancing efficiency builds early wins for a more ambitious, long-term effort.

  
  Most knowledge management interventions ? assessment, design, implementation ? tend to focus on technical solutions created by technical teams, and tend to overlook the organizational processes and institutional incentives that drive information use.

  
  Large-scale knowledge management efforts require stakeholder/user consensus.  New information tends to create ?losers? who may actively resist implementation.  Broadening information use at all levels tends to increase the likelihood of ownership.

  
  Knowledge management systems tend to have the greatest impact on planning and policy support ? at that stage policymakers have the greatest latitude to act in response to new information.

  
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• Fountain, Social Capital
  

  Fountain, Social Capital: A Key Enabler  of Innovation (I) Social capital: stock that is created when a group of  organizations develops the ability to work together  for mutual productive gain. Explains differences in innovation rates among  countries with similar capital, labor, and national  resources. Powerful resource that develops from productive  ties. Characteristics of successful cooperative  arrangements: Transactions, reputations for fairness and reliability  lead to trustful relations; Limited number of players: makes it easier for  information about reputations and transactions to be  shared within the network; Actors must value the long-run relationship highly  enough to forego immediate gains for future  benefits; Clear definition of boundaries and objectives of the  network;      Fountain, Social Capital: A Key Enabler  of Innovation (II) How Social Capital increases innovation Specialized technological knowledge and  innovation: in team-based configurations on the shop floor rather than incorporate laboratories  staffed with scientists working on long-range basic  research = supplier relationships have grown in  importance, because single firms usually cannot  undertake the